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ALatin as a Common Language: The Coherence
of Lorenzo Valla’s Humanist Program
LODI NAUTA, Ri jk suniver s i t e i t GroningenIn his critique of the language and thought of the Scholastics, Lorenzo Valla contrasts classical Latin as a
natural, common language to the so-called artiﬁcial, technical, and unnatural language of his oppo-
nents. He famously champions Quintilian’s view that one should follow common linguistic usage.
Scholars, however, have disagreed about the precise interpretation of these qualiﬁcations of Latin. This
article argues that, depending on the historical, rhetorical, and argumentative contexts, Valla uses no-
tions such as common and natural in different ways to suit different purposes. Such a contextualized
reading has repercussions for an evaluation of the coherence of Valla’s humanist program.INTRODUCTION
WHILE CERTAINLY NOT the ﬁrst to criticize the language of the schools and
universities, the humanist Lorenzo Valla (ca. 1406–57) was the staunchest and
also the most comprehensive critic of his generation. Inspired by the great au-
thors of antiquity, in particular Cicero and Quintilian, and dreaming of a world
in which Latin would be reinstalled as the language of learned conversation and
communication, Valla not only made an in-depth study of all the intricacies of
the Latin language and its literature, documented in his inﬂuential Elegantiae
Linguae Latinae (The ﬁne points of the Latin language, 1441), but also attacked
what he saw as the ungrammatical, barbarous, and uninformative language of
the Aristotelian Scholastics. Like his predecessors, Valla aimed at showing that
postclassical developments of Latin had wrought havoc in the arts and sciences,
and, in particular, in the trivial arts, philosophy, and theology, where words
make all the difference. Hence, a running theme throughout his critique, which
he develops in particular in hisDialectical Disputations (1439), is the oppositionI am indebted to the organizers and participants of conferences and workshops in Chicago, Rome,
Los Angeles, Cambridge, and Munich for questions and discussion of earlier versions of this ar-
ticle. I would also like to thank my colleagues in Groningen for their support and friendship.
I dedicate this article to the memory of Ronald G. Witt, for his inspiring scholarship, and his en-
compassing generosity, enthusiasm, and humor.
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2 VOLUME LXXI, NO. 1RENAISSANCE QUARTERLYbetween the so-called artiﬁcial, technical, unnatural, and distorted language of
his opponents and the Latin of the great authors, which he considers a common
and natural language.
Valla’s position raises some fundamental questions. First of all, how could he
claim that classical Latin is a common, natural language? The humanists accused
the Scholastics of playing an inward game, with their own invented terminol-
ogy, rules, sterile examples, and ritualistic formulas, but arguably the humanists
were not immune from such criticism either: they promoted a language that was
far from common or natural, at least not in the sense of being one’s mother
tongue or the speech of the masses. Mastery of this language helped to establish
a group identity no less than the technical Latin had done for the Scholastics.1
Of course, Valla lived at a time when classical Latin could still (or again) be
viewed as a living language, but the vernacular was on the rise and had a future,
while classical Latin would soon be called a dead language.2 So how did he argue
this point, defending Latin as a natural language in opposition to the language
of the philosophers? And if we are to follow the linguistic usage of the an-
cients—as Valla time and again argues—a further question arises: whose usage
exactly, and why their usage? If Latin of one author or a selective group of authors
or Latin from a particular period is held as normative for the use of Latin at all
times, including Valla’s own, how can such a recommendation be squared with
a historical approach to language also ascribed to humanists such as Valla? In other
words, how can the view of Latin as the timeless language of the arts, sciences,
and reﬁned communication—a view that seems to underlie Valla’s praise of Latin
as the magnum sacramentum (the great sacred teaching) in the preface to the ﬁrst
book of the Elegantiae—be reconciled with a historicization of language, that is, an
approach that sees language as culturally embedded, as something that cannot be
separated from the historical contexts in which it functioned?3 Is there not a deep
ambiguity in Valla’s position, and perhaps in the entire humanist project of treat-
ing Latin as the expression of a historically and geographically bounded culture
while at the same time regarding it as a timelessmedium, transcending boundaries
of time and place, and as a sine qua non for the development of the arts, science,
literature, and reﬁned communication?
Not surprisingly, scholars have been strongly divided over these issues. For
Mariangela Regoliosi, Valla’s position contains “great aporias” and “contradic-1 On language and group identity, see Burke’s introduction in Burke and Porter, 15–16.
On humanists against the Scholastics, see, among many other studies, Rummel; Wels; Moss;
Schmidt; Martin.
2 See Faithfull; Considine; Mazzocco, 242n123.
3 Valla, 1962, 2:4 (Elegantiae 1.proem).
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VALLA ’S HUMANIST PROGRAM 3
Ations.”4 She sees a clear conﬂict between Valla’s emphasis on a descriptive, em-
pirical method in the study of Latin and a certain antistoricismo (antihistoricism).5
Mirko Tavoni, too, has detected something paradoxical in Valla’s emphasis on
common linguistic usage, while this usage was limited to “the international com-
munity of scholars.”6 On the other hand, Silvia Rizzo has denied any such ten-
sions, claiming that Valla’s position is consistent and coherent: Valla’s view of
Latin as an ars—as a highly regimented, secondary, and artiﬁcial (from ars, for
which teachers are needed) language in opposition to the unregulated vulgar
tongues—is a coherent position and in line with the equation of Latin with gram-
matica, made by medieval grammarians, Dante, and Leonardo Bruni.7 And while
Rizzo and other scholars such as Tavoni and John Monfasani have argued that
this common linguistic usage invariably refers to the Latin of the learned authors
of antiquity, Salvatore I. Camporeale believed that the notion of common linguis-
tic usage had a broader application, and he even identiﬁed it with the vulgar
tongue.8 Camporeale also argued that Valla might have developed a kind of his-
torical grammar, a claim strongly rejected by other scholars.9 Even more radical
was RichardWaswo, who argued that for Valla “the whole value of the ‘common
custom of speaking’ goes far beyond the particular predominant in the Institutio
oratoria, to invoke the wider purpose of making semantic distinctions useful in
ordinary life.”10 And the debate is still going on.
These interpretations have repercussions for the interpretation of what Valla
meant by a word such as natural: Regoliosi, for instance, identiﬁes it with Latin,
Rizzo with the vernacular.11 It also has repercussions for how one interprets an-
other important but ambiguous term, ratio (reason, account, analysis).12 For those
who discern an essentially descriptive project in Valla’s study of Latin, based on
his vast reading of classical and postclassical sources, reason stands in opposition
to usage, and hence does not play a signiﬁcant role in Valla’s thought, certainly
not when the notion of ratio is associated with the rational reconstructions of lan-4 Regoliosi, 2000, 334–35; Regoliosi, 2010, 114.
5 Regoliosi, 2000, 335.
6 Tavoni, 1986, 213: “prevalentemente scritto della comunità internazionale dei dotti.”
7 Rizzo, 2002, 17.
8 Monfasani, 323; Tavoni, 1984 and 1986; Camporeale, 190.
9 Camporeale, 184, 188–90; criticized by Tavoni, 1984, 149; Tavoni, 1986, 212.
10 Waswo, 1979, 259; cf. Waswo, 1987, 97–104; Gerl, 223–25; Nauta, 2009, 274–80;
Nauta, 2015a.
11 Regoliosi, 2000, 326; Rizzo, 2002, 113.
12 In Valla, 2012, ratio has been translated in many different ways, depending on the context:
reason, explanation, (line of ) reasoning, account, argument, system, structure, procedure, way,
theory, methods, approach, plan.
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4 VOLUME LXXI, NO. 1RENAISSANCE QUARTERLYguage and meaning developed by medieval speculative grammarians, the so-
called Modists.13 For those who stress the normative aspect of Valla’s studies,
reason in the sense of a certain rationalization and idealization of linguistic phe-
nomena, not necessarily supported by observation of actual usage, does have a
place in Valla’s thinking. Lucia Cesarini Martinelli, for instance, has stressed
the normative character of Valla’s analysis of Latin that often foists “an intellec-
tual scheme” on the linguistic data, creating “a rigorously rational interpreta-
tion.”14 Valla let himself be guided by ratio no less than by usus (usage).15 On
this view, the empirical, inductive, and descriptive aspect is often accompanied
by a craving for symmetry, harmonization, and rationalization of diverse and ap-
parently contradicting linguistic phenomena.
This kind of rationalization of conﬂicting data ascribed to Valla is also some-
thing that can be detected among modern scholars, who sometimes seem to feel
forced to choose between one or the other position. The aim of this article is to
suggest that it is not an either-or question: it is not either descriptive or norma-
tive, either reason or usage, either timeless ars or historical development. What
is required is an examination of the many instances where Valla uses these terms.
It will then turn out that, depending on the historical, rhetorical, and argumen-
tative contexts, he stresses this or that aspect, using qualiﬁcations such as natural,
common speech, and the common people in different ways to suit the argument
at stake. An evaluation of the coherence of Valla’s program depends, therefore, on
how much emphasis is put on some statements rather than on others.
In what follows, Valla’s remarks on Latin and on the relationship between Latin
and the vernacular will be considered ﬁrst, focusing on his use of terms such as
linguistic usage, common speech, and natural speech. This will show how his criti-
cisms of Scholastic-Aristotelian philosophy are motivated by his ideas about
Latin and language in general. Though closely related, the two topics are not the
same: Valla’s remarks on Latin and the vernacular must be seen against the back-
ground of the famous debate among humanists on various issues concerning the
use of Latin in antiquity and its relationship with their own linguistic situation,
while his attack on Scholastic language must be understood ﬁrst and foremost
as a critical and often-polemical engagement with the Aristotelian Organon and
its medieval interpreters. But even though these issues—and the contexts in which13 Regoliosi, 2010, 121: “descriptive and not normative”; Marsh, 97 (“rigorous historical
perspective”), 106 (“induction”), 107 (“inductive analysis” and “inductive observation”), and
so on.
14 Cesarini Martinelli, 75; cf. ibid., 73. See also Gaeta, 79–126; Gavinelli; Miguel Franco,
21–28.
15 Cesarini Martinelli, 75; see also ibid., 78; cf. Fubini, 1961, 544, who speaks out about
“a strongly intellectualistic component.”
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VALLA ’S HUMANIST PROGRAM 5
Athey arose—are not the same, I will suggest that Valla applies some of his ideas,
developed in the humanist debates on Latin, to his analysis and critique of Scho-
lastic language.
It is expedient, therefore, to look closely at a number of passages, distinguish-
ing between pairs of terms that he uses in a variety of argumentative contexts.
These two issues also have something in common, viz. their rhetorical and polem-
ical nature, which makes it not always easy to see what Valla’s own opinion is, in
particular in his debates with his archenemy Poggio Bracciolini (1380–1459). In-
vectives are not the place to look for well-formulated and well-argued positions,
and the same is true for Valla’s polemical attacks on the Scholastics in theDialec-
tical Disputations. Given these considerations, it would be ill-advised to turn Valla
into a philosopher of language and expect him to develop clearly delineated and
well-argued positions on language, language acquisition, and the rise of the ver-
naculars, as well as the relationship between language and thought and between
language and theworld. But behind the polemics a serious position can be detected
based on the conviction that philosophizingmust be conducted in a natural, com-
mon language, and that classical Latin is the perfect vehicle for doing so. Many
people then and now do not share this conviction, arguing that humanists such
as Valla failed to see the need and usefulness of a technical vocabulary. From a
historical point of view, however, the humanist critique cannot be ignored: it
was repeated time and again in the early modern period, and it helped to prepare
the way for the rise of new philosophical and scientiﬁc ways of thinking and writ-
ing by criticizing Scholastic Aristotelianism. The aim of this article is to analyze an
important ﬁrst step in this critique of technical language and the possible tensions
such a critique contains.16LATIN AND THE VERNACULAR: THE DEBATE
The humanist debate on Latin, as has often been described, started in the ante-
chamber of Pope Eugene IV (1383–1447) in Florence in 1435, where several hu-
manists discussed the question of what kind of language the common people in
ancient Rome had used.17 Did a sharp distinction exist between the vulgaris sermo
(common speech) of the illitterati (illiterate) and the sermo litteratus (learned, lit-16 I have treated the theme of this article much more cursorily in Nauta, 2009, 276–80, and
more recently inNauta, 2015a. For some keymoments in the history of this language critique, see
Nauta, 2015b (on Vives) and 2016.
17 On the debate, see Grayson; Fubini, 1961; Tavoni, 1984; Dionisotti; Mazzocco, 30–105;
Coletti; Pittaluga; Fubini, 2003, 9–42. The relevant texts are conveniently assembled in Tavoni,
1984.
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6 VOLUME LXXI, NO. 1RENAISSANCE QUARTERLYerate speech) of the learned and educated people, or did they use more or less the
same kind of language, with due recognition of differences in the quality of their
style and words depending on their cultural and intellectual background? And
how did this issue translate to their own times, also characterized by diglossia,
with the resurrected classical Latin next to—and sometimes in opposition to—
themany vernacular tongues? Several humanists expressed their opinions on these
issues in the following years. The point of departure was the position of Leonardo
Bruni (1370–1444), who had argued for a clear separation between the two lan-
guages in antiquity.18 The illitterati in ancient Rome could not speak latine et
litterate (Latin and literate)—that is, they could not conjugate verbs, inﬂect nouns,
and make well-formed sentences. It was tempting to see the volgare of their own
time as a descendant of this ancient sermo vulgaris (common language), but Bruni
did not explicitly argue for such continuity, even though hewas interpreted in this
way by other participants in the debate and bymodern scholars.19 As a Florentine,
a user of the vernacular himself, and a translator, Bruni certainly had much sym-
pathy for the vernacular (that is, his own Florentine, of course), but he saw a clear
contrast between the two—just as there had been a clear contrast in antiquity—
and he deﬁned this contrast in terms of ars and natura, between regulated and
unregulated language, identifying Latin with grammatica as many medieval writ-
ers, including Dante, had done.20
A somewhat different position was taken by the Roman humanist Flavio
Biondo (1392–1463), who argued in his De Verbis Romanae Locutionis (On the
words of Roman speech, 1435) that the people in antiquity were members of
the same linguistic community: the common people were able to understand plays
and speeches.21 Rather than a clear-cut separation between the two types of lan-
guages, Biondo believed there was a variety of usages of the latina lingua from
common people at one end of the spectrum to orators and poets on the other
end. Independent vernaculars only arose much later out of Latin, when barbarian
tribes invaded Europe. The Latin had therefore to be reconquered and puriﬁed
from vernacular contaminations.
The details of the debate between these and other protagonists, such as Leon
Battista Alberti (1404–72), Guarino Guarini (1374–1460), and Poggio Braccio-
lini, need not be discussed here; what has been said is enough to locate Valla in this18 On Bruni’s position, see Tavoni, 1984, 3–41 (discussion), 216–21 (texts).
19 Tavoni, 1982, 238.
20 On Dante, see Corti; Rosier-Catach in Dante, with extensive literature. On Bruni’s ver-
nacular writings and translations, see Hankins.
21 See Tavoni, 1984, 197–215 (text), 3–41 (commentary); Mazzocco. For a critical edition,
see Biondo.
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VALLA ’S HUMANIST PROGRAM 7
Adebate.22 From several of his writings, in particular the Elegantiae, the Apologus
(1453), theOratio in Principio sui Studii (Inaugural lecture, 1455), and some scat-
tered remarks from the Dialectical Disputations, the following picture of Valla’s
views can be distilled, but it is certainly not always clear-cut. Before the rise of Latin
in antiquity, there were many languages, as the story of Babel, to which Valla
makes incidental reference, testiﬁes.23 In the Italian Peninsula the italica lingua
(the Italian language) was “diverse and manifold.”24 Initially, Latin was close to
the language of the vulgus (common people). Talking about Greek and Latin,
Valla writes, “of course Greek at that time was practically one and the same for
common people and for the learned [vulgi et litteratorum]—just as it was with
the ancient Romans, whose language is sometimes called ‘Roman’ . . . and some-
times ‘Latin.’”25 This seems to imply that, as the language of learned communica-
tion, literature, the arts, and the sciences, Latin developed as a highly regulated
form of Latin from this common ground. The masses could not speak or write
this grammatically correct and eloquent language of the poets, the orators, and
other learned people. The existence of schools and teachers in antiquity is proof
enough for Valla that it had to be learned; it did not come naturally or sponta-
neously to people. Still, they all belonged to one linguistic community of Latin
users. The learned people can be said to have spoken “more ornately” or “more
eloquently,” but they were not “more Latinate [latinius].”26
Valla does not say much about the relationships between the pre-Latin lan-
guages, the sermo vulgaris, and the sermo litteratus. In the Elegantiae he suggests
that Latin existed alongside but independent from the vernacular languages (“to
which it added luster rather than destroying them”).27 And in his Apologus
against Poggio Bracciolini he writes that the pre-Latin languages yielded or gave
precedence to Latin during the time of the Roman expansion, without explicitly22 Debate might not be the right term, since it implies that the protagonists knew (directly)
of each other’s contributions. In the case of Valla, this was probably not the case: Tavoni,
1984, 128n26.
23 Valla, 1982, 2:433 (Repastinatio 1.19.10); Valla in Rizzo, 1994, 196. See Nauta, 2009,
56; Tavoni, 1984, 155.
24 Valla, 1962, 1:384 (Apologus 2); Tavoni, 1984, 263: “diversa ac multiplex.”
25 Valla, 2012, 1:9 (Dialectical Disputations [hereafter DD] 1.proem.12). The equation of
Roman with Latin was not accepted by Poggio Bracciolini for whom romana lingua (the Ro-
man language) referred to the vernacular spoken in Rome in his own time: see Tavoni, 1984,
123–24.
26 Text in Camporeale, 525, 529; Tavoni, 1984, 266, 271.
27 According to Valla, the people conquered by the Romans deplored the loss of their free-
dom but recognized that Latin did not diminish, but rather enriched, their language: Valla,
1962, 1:3 (Elegantiae 1.proem). On this theme, see De Caprio; Fisher.
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8 VOLUME LXXI, NO. 1RENAISSANCE QUARTERLYsaying that later, probably after the Roman Empire, they developed into the ver-
nacular languages as he knew them from his own time.28 He recognized that
Italian, French, and Spanish “have a certain afﬁnity,” stating that Spanish de-
rived from Italian.29 What Valla did not want to suggest is that classical Latin
transformed or developed into these vernacular languages. It had been there
since antiquity, and though knowledge of it had dramatically declined with bar-
barian invasions and, later, with the rise of medieval schools and universities,
it was Rome’s semipermanent gift to the world. Valla lived in a Latin universe,
and all later postclassical languages—the (Roman) vernaculars and medieval
Latin—could be regarded only as depraved, corrupted versions of Latin. It might
seem strange that he considered the modern vernaculars as a kind of Latin too,
but this probably had something to do with his Roman patriotism. If he had as-
signed an independent status to the vernacular in antiquity, this would have jeop-
ardized the cultural-linguistic continuum that Latin had established through the
ages. It would also have set the Roman vernacular of his own day in opposition to
other vernaculars, in particular the Florentine one, a contest that Rome would
surely have lost.30 Valla’s Latin perspective was thus all-inclusive and led him
to label the modern vernaculars as a form of (depraved) Latin too.31
Valla’s position seems thus to steer a middle course between Bruni and
Biondo. At times he seems to agree with Bruni that there was a considerable dis-
tance between the sermo vulgaris and the sermo litteratus in antiquity, just as there
was diglossia in his own day; Latin in the more speciﬁc sense of a highly regulated
ars was something different from the more natural speech that the masses spoke.
But at other times he stresses the continuity between what may be called lower
and higher forms of Latin, seemingly thinking of a more gradual situation. Be-
cause Valla also applies Latin to the variety (or varieties) of language used by the
common people, he could not identify Latin with grammatica, as a regulated lan-
guage as opposed to the vernacular—an identiﬁcation that Bruni and medieval
authors including Dante had made. Not being a Florentine, Valla also does not
share Bruni’s fairly favorable judgment of the vernacular and, like Biondo, he does
not show a great interest in the vernacular.28 Valla, 1962, 1:384 (Apologus 2); Tavoni, 1984, 263. For the context of the debate with
Poggio Bracciolini, see Wesseling’s introduction in Valla, 1978, 25–39; Camporeale.
29 Valla, 1962, 1:388 (Apologus 2); Tavoni, 1984, 272; Valla, 1962, 1:29 (Elegantiae
1.29).
30 On the rivalry between Rome and Florence in the language debate, see Cesarini Martinelli,
35–42; Mazzocco, 78–81.
31 See Tavoni, 1984, 140. On Valla’s disregard for the vernacular, see Regoliosi’s intro-
duction in Valla, 1981, lx; Mazzocco, 81; Rizzo, 2002, 115.
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VALLA ’S HUMANIST PROGRAM 9
A“COMMON LANGUAGE”
From the discussion so far it is clear why Valla thinks Latin to be a common, nat-
ural language: it was—in one form or another—the language of Roman antiquity,
either as the sermo vulgaris of the common people or the sermo litteratus of the
learned. It was also common in the sense that it had been the international lan-
guage of learned communication and scholarship throughout the ages. Vernacular
languages do not enter into the picture as serious alternatives as they are all to be
regarded as depraved forms of Latin. When Valla uses the term sermo vulgaris,
he does not as a rule mean the vernacular. To refer to Latin as a common lan-
guage, Valla employs different terms such as sermo vulgaris, sermo communis, sermo
popularis, communis loquendi consuetudo (common linguistic usage), sermo omnium
(the speech of all people). As will be seen, these terms are used often inter-
changeably. I will start with sermo vulgaris.
In classical Latin vulgaris means “of or belonging to the great mass or multi-
tude,” “general,” “usual,” “ordinary,” “everyday,” “common,” “commonplace,”
“vulgar,” and so on. Quintilian used vulgo, for instance, in the sense of “usually”
or “commonly.”32 The samemeaning is found in Valla. Expressions such as sermo
vulgaris (common language), vulgo dicitur (it is said commonly), ut vulgus ait (as
the common people say), and vulgus testante (as testiﬁed by the common people),
usually refer to Latin.33 For example, he criticizes Poggio Bracciolini who thinks,
“with the people” (cum vulgo), that the word perpendere means “to understand”
rather than “to weigh carefully.” In the Elegantiae he comments on the use of
quidem (indeed, also, but), mentioning a third way of using this word, “which
makes the sermo vulgaris clear,” giving an example fromCicero.34He observes that
quippe and utpote are “commonly” or “generally” (vulgo) taken tomean “certainly”
(certe), a use that Valla does not completely reject, he says, though he prefers to take
them pro causativis, that is, introducing a fact that gives a reason or cause, meaning
“for” or “because.” In a discussion on the difference between quidam /aliquis (a cer-
tain/someone) he writes, “we commonly say” (vulgo loquimur) that “a certain one
wrote to a certain one,” in which quidam rather than aliquis is used;35 this is “the
common expression” (vulgaris sermo). Such examples can easily be multiplied. In32 Quintilian, 5:208 (Institutio oratoria 12.1.24).
33 For the examples that follow in this paragraph, see the references in Tavoni, 1986, 200n1.
Tavoni also gives examples of words, explained or mentioned by Valla, of which a vernacular
equivalent exists, but he argues that this is clearly irrelevant: “Valla reasons in Latin.” Ibid., 201.
34 Valla, 1962, 1:60 (Elegantiae 2.23); cf. ibid., 1:107 (Elegantiae 3.52), a chapter entitled
“On a Common Usage of ‘to Me’ and ‘to You’ with Two Ciceronian Examples,” mentioned
by Tavoni, 1986, 202n5.
35 Valla, 1982, 2:461 (Repastinatio 2.3.12); Valla, 2012, 2:41 (DD 2.5.18).
This content downloaded from 129.125.136.103 on April 10, 2018 03:13:46 AM
ll use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms and Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).
10 VOLUME LXXI , NO. 1RENAISSANCE QUARTERLYall such cases Valla is not thinking of the vernacular but of more or less accept-
able forms of Latin attested by texts and practice, without, however, giving a
clear reference to a particular variety or a particular historical period.
When Valla wants to refer to the vernacular he usually uses expressions such
as illiterate loqui (speaking illiterately), idiotarummore loqui (speaking in theman-
ner of the unlearned, unlettered, lay people), vernacula lingua (vernacular lan-
guage), or lingua materna (mother tongue); litteratus and idiota form a clear
opposition in his mind.36 Only in a handful of cases does he use vulgo to refer to
the vernacular: indulgentia (forbearance) is commonly (vulgo) accepted for venia;
those who were called argentarii (money-changers) in antiquity are commonly
(vulgo) called campsores;margarita (pearl) is commonly (vulgo) called perla.37 There
are also some cases where it is not easy to determine whether Valla was consider-
ing a particular word as a volgarismo or still a form of Latin; from a theoretical
point of view, he considered, as noted above, all these languages or types of lan-
guage as Latin. What is clear, however, is that in the vast majority of cases where
Valla uses sermo vulgaris he is thinking and talking about Latin.“COMMON LINGUISTIC USAGE”
With these ﬁndings in mind I will now turn to the important notion, frequently
invoked by Valla, of the communis consuetudo loquendi (common linguistic usage)
and closely related expressions such as consuetudo popularis (popular custom),mos
loquendi (the usual manner or custom of speaking), and usus (practice or conven-
tion). Valla frequently employs this notion of linguistic usage to argue against the
Scholastics. His sources of inspiration are of course the great orators of Roman
antiquity, Cicero and, in particular, Quintilian, who must be brieﬂy discussed.
In a famous discussion in the ﬁrst book of his Institutio oratoria (Institutes of
oratory), Quintilian, following Cicero, had defended linguistic usage as the gov-
erning principle for accounting for linguistic phenomena, including irregularities
and anomalies in grammar and morphology (e.g., declensions and conjugations),
against grammarians who had prescribed certain forms on the basis of analogy or
reason—that is, a set of highly regular patterns of word formation. In general, Ro-36 Valla, 2012, 2:124 (DD 2.18.4). To give just one example: “to see” is called “lo vedere”
by lay people or the uneducated (idiotis); ibid., 1:70 (DD 1.5.10). Valla also uses rusticanus
loqui to refer to the vernacular; plebeius loqui can refer to both, while quotidianus sermo clearly
refers to Latin: Tavoni, 1986, 210–11. Yet in Valla, 2012, 1:171 (DD 1.10.71), the term
idiota seems to be used to refer to (some form of ) Latin: “as when uneducated people
[idiotas] say ‘I’m doing well in my affairs [bene ago res meas].’”
37 For these examples, see Valla, 1962, 1:127, 138, 235 (Elegantiae 4.18, 4.44, 6.64); and
in Tavoni, 1986, 202.
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VALLA ’S HUMANIST PROGRAM 11
Aman grammarians took the side of analogy, orators the side of anomaly. Gram-
marians proposed, for example, to change ebur (ivory) and robur (strength), found
among “the highest authorities,” into ebor and robor, because their genetives are
roboris and eboris, and because sulphur (sulphur) and guttur (throat) keep the u in
the genitive.38 Quintilian was against such active interventions from teachers of
grammar:39 “Analogy was not sent down from heaven to frame the rules of lan-
guage when men were ﬁrst created, but was discovered only when they were al-
ready using language and note was taken of the way in which particular words
ended in speech. It rests therefore not upon Reason but upon Precedent; it is
not a law of speech, but an observed practice, Analogy itself being merely the
product of Usage.” After some more examples, Quintilian famously concludes
that “speaking Latin is one thing, and speaking grammatically quite another.”40
It is from observation of linguistic usage and custom that rules for speaking and
writing must be derived. Usage is “the surest teacher of speaking, and we should
treat language likemoneymarkedwith the public stamp [publica forma].”41 Before
Quintilian, Cicero had used the image of the balance: “For this oratory of ours
must be adapted to the ears of the multitude, for charming or urging their minds
to approve of proposals, which are weighed in no goldsmith’s balance, but in what
I may call common scales [populari quadam trutina].”42
But what is usage? It cannot be deﬁned as “what most people do,”Quintilian
says, for there are enough practices in life found among the majority that we
should not want to follow, such as “plucking the hairs of the legs or armpits, ar-
ranging one’s coiffure in tiers, getting dead drunk at the baths.”43 “So too in
speech,” he continues, “we must not accept as a rule of language any bad habits
which have become ingrained in many people. To say nothing of the language of
the uneducated, we know that whole theatres and the entire circus crowd often
commit Barbarisms in the shouting they make.”Quintilian deﬁnes usage in speech
“as the consensus of the educated, just as Usage in life is the consensus of the
good.”44 Language as a reﬂection and expression of good manners was of course
central to Quintilian’s oratorical outlook. His analogy between language and a
coin with a popular stamp was not meant as a plea to follow the majority, let
alone the uneducated people: this publica forma (public stamp) of current linguis-
tic usage refers to the agreed practice of the educated people.38 Quintilian, 1:171 (Institutio oratoria 1.6.22). On this debate, see Marsh, 98.
39 Quintilian, 1:169 (Institutio oratoria 1.6.16).
40 Ibid., 1:173 (Institutio oratoria 1.6.27).
41 Ibid., 1:163 (Institutio oratoria 1.6.3).
42 Cicero, 1942a, 313 (De oratore 2.38.159).
43 Quintilian, 1:183–85 (Institutio oratoria 1.6.44).
44 Ibid., 1:185.
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12 VOLUME LXXI , NO. 1RENAISSANCE QUARTERLYValla knew this chapter 6 of the ﬁrst book of the Institutio oratoria very well—
indeed, he claimed to know the entire Institutio virtually by heart.45 In his dis-
pute with Poggio Bracciolini, who had misunderstood Quintilian’s position and
had criticized Valla’s Elegantiae, Valla defends linguistic usage, siding with the
anomalists and stressing that linguistic usage should sanction the rules of gram-
mar and determine the meaning of words. Valla uses various terms more or less
interchangeably: we should follow the communis loquendi consuetudo (common
linguistic usage), sermo communis (common or ordinary speech), consuetudo popu-
laris (common usage), usus loquendi (spoken usage), usus et consuetudo loquendi
(usage and custom in speaking), or quotidiana communisque loquendi consuetudo
(everyday and communal practice of speaking).46 But what exactly does Valla
mean by these terms? As already explained, the vernacular does not play any se-
rious role in Valla’s Latin world, and, when it comes to Latin style, Valla often
defends the consuetudo peritorum (the usage of the learned people), referring to
the best authors (maximi auctores, summi auctores) and the orators, who spoke
and wrote the best Latin.47
Following Quintilian, who had insisted on observation rather than on hard
and fast rules, Valla explains his method in theElegantiae as follows: “Throughout
this work, I am not pursuing the license of the poets so much as the usage of the
orators. And it should not be held against me if discrepant readings are found in
the best writers, for I am not framing a law as if one never wrote otherwise, but
noting what was most frequently observed, especially by Cicero and Quintil-
ian.”48 It is the sermo litteratus that is usually Valla’s object of study. As he writes
in the Dialectical Disputations, referring again to Quintilian: “As for us, we must
speak according to a grammatical standard, speaking not so much grammatically
as in Latin—following not somuch the rules of an art, in other words, as the usage
of the educated and cultured people, which is the best art of all. And who does not
know that speaking is based mainly on usage and authority.”49 Valla then cites
Quintilian’s comparison of money and language. And after having inserted a long
quotation fromQuintilian in the third book of hisDialectical Disputations, he ex-
plains why he had done so: “In this book, and in the one before, I have taken on
his teachings as the best and most deﬁnitive not only because they are indis-
pensable but also because they are suited not just to dialecticians and philoso-
phers but also to the civil law and all the arts and to the everyday and communal45 Valla, 1981, 42; Valla, 1962, 1:477 (Antidotum in Facium).
46 Valla, 2012, 2:395 (DD 3.15.42), 1:89 (DD 1.8.1), 1:231 (DD 1.16.7).
47 E.g., Valla, 1962, 1:385 (Apologus 2).
48 Ibid., 1:22 (Elegantiae 1.17), translated in Marsh, 107. See Quintilian, 1:168 (Institutio
oratoria 1.6.16).
49 Valla, 2012, 2:85 (DD 2.11.6).
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VALLA ’S HUMANIST PROGRAM 13
Apractice of speaking [quotidianae communique loquendi consuetudini]. For when
dialecticians teach about this topic and give their examples, they seem to be singing
(if singing it is, and not croaking) to themselves.”50
In these passages Valla’s aim is clearly to champion the Latin usage of the ed-
ucated and cultured people, and this is how most scholars have interpreted his
position. A more detailed look at Valla’s work, however, suggests that the picture
is more complicated. Terms such as common or popular linguistic usage and related
terms such as natural language and common people turn out to be ﬂexible tools
that, depending on the argumentative and polemical context, can bring about
an unlikely—and un-Quintilianesque—coalition of the educated people and the
common, uneducated people to contrast natural language with what Valla sees as
the artiﬁciality and unnatural character of Scholastic language and argumentation.REASON, AUTHORITY, AND COMMON
LINGUISTIC USAGE
Though Valla closely associates common linguistic usage with the orators and
the best authors (maximi auctores, summi auctores), he does not always identify the
two with each other. In line with Quintilian’s statement that “language is based
on Reason, Antiquity, Authority, and Usage [sermo constat ratione vetustate aucto-
ritate consuetudine],” Valla often distinguishes between these sources of speech,
apparently taking antiquity and authority together.51 A particularly good example
is the reduction of the ten Aristotelian categories to substance, quality, and ac-
tion—the only three that Valla admits. To understand this, it will sufﬁce to note
that in the ancient and medieval grammatical tradition it was quite common to
accept these three categories as ultimate referents of words and word classes.
The question was, for instance, how nouns, adjectives, verbs, and pronouns refer
to one or more of these categories. Verbs, for instance, were supposed to refer
to actions, nouns to qualiﬁed substances, and pronouns perhaps, as Priscian had
argued in his Institutiones grammatice, to substance without quality.52 How gram-
matical categories map onto the world was of course a major question for gram-
marians, and throughout book 1 of the Dialectical Disputations Valla is often
asking the same question: does this word (or word class) refer to substance, to qual-
ity, or to an action (or to two or three categories at the same time)? This gram-
matical approach is prominently at work in his reduction of the individual
accidental categories to his triad; in his reduction of the six transcendental terms
to just one, namely res (thing); and in his analysis of abstract terms, terms of logic50 Ibid., 2:395 (DD 3.15.42).
51 Quintilian, 1:161 (Institutio oratoria 1.6.1).
52 Priscian, 2:60 (Institutiones grammaticae 13.6.29); see Robins, 71; Law, 52–93.
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14 VOLUME LXXI , NO. 1RENAISSANCE QUARTERLYand argumentation, and distinctions such as matter/form and act/potency.53 In
many of these discussions Valla frequently quotes the usual authorities, but he also
appeals to “common linguistic usage” or “how everyone talks” (sermo omnium) as
something with its own argumentative force, often introduced by “we say”
(dicimus) or “we are used to saying” (dicere solemus).54 As will become clear in what
follows, linguistic usage usually refers to Latin, but sometimes it refers to theway in
which people speak and write, regardless of which language they use.
I will ﬁrst give some examples where the context is clearly Latin. When he ar-
gues that the Aristotelian category of quantity should be reduced to that of qual-
ity, Valla ﬁrst cites Cicero and Quintilian, and then states that “linguistic usage
itself also conﬁrms this”—namely, that “quantity is entirely a matter of quality”:
“For when someone asks ‘what kind of ﬁeld did you buy,’ you answer, ‘oblong at
the start, then wider, two furrows long and of varying width.’”55 Later on Valla
makes more or less the same point: “Mind you, it is not just me but the greatest
authorities as well who say that this is quality, which linguistic usage [loquendi
consuetudo] itself—the best guide—afﬁrms and reason [ratio] does not resist.”56
“We speak” (dicimus) of a great heat, little coldness, long sound, and so on,57
and quantitative predicates (“is big,” “is two years old,” “is ﬁve feet tall”) are used
to qualify a thing. A few paragraphs later Quintilian is quoted on the same point,
one that is obvious “even to ordinary people [vulgus]”: “For them, if someone asks
‘what kind of voice did Stentor have,’ you answer ‘big,’ ‘large,’ ‘huge.’”58 He con-
tinues to suggest that quantitative terms such as length,width, and depth are much
the same, differing only “by some sort of quality”: “Because of this we usually say
[dicere solemus] of certain plots of land that ‘they are longer on the sides than at the
ends,’ which is also how geometers talk about the earth.”59 In short, from a gram-
matical perspective, terms of quantity, just as terms of relation (e.g., father), qual-
ify a thing no less than qualitative terms such as good or red do.
Likewise, the reduction of the Aristotelian category of having (of which Ar-
istotle gives as examples armed, having shoes on) to quality is supported by “how
everyone talks” (sermo omnium): “For even though arms, clothing and shoes are
bodily things, they still introduce a quality into the man since this is how every-
one talks: ‘that one defenseless, and not the kind to go into battle armed.’ . . .53 For discussion, see Mack, 42–58; Nauta, 2009, 82–125.
54 Valla, 1982, 2:434 (Repastinatio 1.20.1); Valla, 2012, 1:234 (DD 1.16.16), 1:254
(DD 1.17.21), 1:264 (DD 1.17.38), out of many examples.
55 Valla, 2012, 1:245 (DD 1.17.7).
56 Ibid., 1:247 (DD 1.17.9).
57 Ibid. (DD 1.17.11); the examples are Valla’s.
58 Ibid., 1:255 (DD 1.17.19).
59 Ibid. (DD 1.17.21).
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ASince things that are part of the body itself produce quality, why be surprised at
things that come from the outside? When asked ‘what kind of man is that,’ we
answer ‘stout, fat, plump and hairy.’”60 From a grammatical point of view, there
is no reason to make a difference between such words, and hence no reason to
make an ontological difference between the categories: a quality such as stout
is on a par with a quality like armed.While Valla’s point obviously refers to Latin
and is made in Latin, it is broader than that: it is premised on the belief that things
are qualiﬁed substances, something that is reﬂected in the way people speak.
Valla also appeals to what “we are used to saying” in the reduction of the cat-
egory of passion (or being affected) to action. Even if we stand, rest, or do noth-
ing, we do something, and hence such verbs signify action: “when asked ‘what’s
going on,’ a normal answer for us [respondere solemus] is ‘standing,’ ‘lying,’ ‘sit-
ting,’ ‘resting,’ or ‘stopping.’ . . . Elsewhere Cicero also asks ‘what better can I
do, particularly when doing nothing?’ While doing nothing we do something,
then, and even sleeping must also be called an action of some sort.”61 Being af-
fected, Valla argues elsewhere, is an action “because feeling an affect is an action
in exactly the same way as understanding a danger.”62 Valla’s point then seems
to be a conceptual one about actions, a point that guides his grammatical obser-
vations.
That linguistic usage is not always identical to authority can also be seen in
Valla’s discussion of the difference between quidam (a certain) and aliquis (some-
one). Using consuetudo loquendi and vulgaris sermo interchangeably, he writes: “If
what they want is ordinary language [consuetudo loquendi], I say the same thing
about this as about other particulars, and here it is in everyday speech [vulgaris
sermo]: ‘there is not someone luckier than me.’ . . . If they require authority,
we ﬁnd examples whenever these terms occur. . . . If analysis [ratio] is what
you want, it is easy to produce.”63 While the plain, normal, daily way of speak-
ing about things is not always identical to the usage as found in authorities such
as Cicero, Virgil, and Quintilian, Valla claims that the former is often corroborated
by the latter.
The difference between quidam and aliquis is also corroborated by reason (ra-
tio), Valla says, by which he means here the reason why a particular usage reﬂects
the situation particularly well. In the example of the distinction between quidam
and aliquis rational analysis comes close to rephrasing the right usages of these
terms and their negations; “with a negation ‘some’ [aliquis] is generally universal”;
“when I say ‘some one [aliquis] of you called me,’ I signify, while speaking in turn60 Ibid., 1:241 (DD 1.17.1).
61 Ibid., 1:235–37 (DD 1.16.16).
62 Ibid., 1:277 (DD 1.17.57).
63 Ibid., 2:61–63 (DD 2.8.2–5).
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16 VOLUME LXXI , NO. 1RENAISSANCE QUARTERLYto each one, that either you, who are some one [aliquis] of these people, have
called me, or else some other you, also some one of them. Therefore, when I deny
that I have been called by some one [ab aliquo] of you, I signify that neither you,
nor you and so on has called me, and this means nothing else than that non-any
[nullus] of you has calledme.”64 In the example quoted above about the reduction
of quantity to quality, reason is basically the fact (or, rather, Valla’s claim) that
“quantity is contained in quality,” hence that quality is the overarching category,
a fact reﬂected by linguistic usage.65 As said, part of Valla’s project is to explain
how grammatical categories map onto the world—how verbs usually refer to ac-
tions, for instance. Reason can then be broadly understood as the explanation of
how the Latin language, as found among the good authors, maps onto the com-
mon world of things (substances, qualities, actions) as Valla understood it.66 In
this sense, reason is not quite the same as reason in the context of the debate,men-
tioned above, between analogists and anomalists, in which reason stands for the
regularity of morphology and strict grammatical rules versus observation of lin-
guistic usage, or, in other words, between an a priori approach in analyzing speech
versus an a posteriori, empirical one. When this approach becomes so abstract
that it transcends the level of particular languages, reason becomes something
wholly negative as when Valla accuses the medieval speculative grammarians,
the so-called Modists, of following reason without paying any attention to the
differences in the various languages.
In many other places Valla appeals to common or ordinary usage on its own,
without invoking reason and authority as other criteria. In discussing qualities
cognized by the senses, he comments on the misuse of the name of the sense
for the name of its object by appealing to what we normally say: “Wecall [dicimus]
a touch ‘hard,’ ‘soft,’ ‘rough’ and ‘smooth’ although being so belongs not to the
sense that perceives but to the thing perceived.”67 He continues: “in ordinary us-
age [ad communem loquendi consuetudinem] ‘lightness’ and ‘heaviness’ refer to
weight, as in ‘light weight’ and ‘heavy weight.’”When he criticizes Aristotle’s dis-
tinction of act and potency, he exclaims: “Howmuch better it would have been to
keep the ordinary way of speaking [communem loquendi consuetudinem]: ‘this
wood can be made into a box’!”68 Criticizing the application of the term materia64 Ibid.
65 Ibid., 1:247 (DD 1.17.11).
66 See Nauta, 2009, 46–47, 80–81. I will come back to reason below; for a discussion of
some uses of Valla’s use of ratio, see Cesarini Martinelli, 47–79; see also Regoliosi, 2000, with
a critique by Rizzo, 2002, 107–18; Regliosi, 2010.
67 Valla, 2012, 1:207 (DD 1.14.3). Regoliosi, 2010, 121, notes that in the Elegantiae, usus is
by far themost common notion, and that Valla often refers to it without evenmentioning reason.
68 Valla, 2012, 1:231 (DD 1.16.7).
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A(matter) to God or the sun, he comments that “ordinary language [sermo com-
munis] treats ‘matter’ like the wood in a box, the stones in a house.”69 From all
these examples it is clear that in these discussions Valla is working within the
sphere of Latin.THE WAY OF THE PEOPLE VERSUS
THE WAY OF THE PHILOSOPHERS
In other passages, however, linguistic usage refers to the way in which people ac-
tually speak and argue, seemingly regardless of which language they use. The con-
trast is between the way of the people and the way of the philosophers, between a
natural way of using words and arguments versus a so-called artiﬁcial, contorted,
and twisted way of using words and analyzing arguments. Talking about the
number 1, for instance, Valla sneers at the Aristotelians who consider 1 not a
number but the principle of number. “Mere women” (mulierculae) know better:
when they divide up their eggs, 1 is of course considered to be a number, the ﬁrst
(uneven) number: “so mere women sometimes have a better sense about under-
standing words than mighty philosophers. Women actually put words to use [ad
usum], while philosophers play games with them [ad lusum].”70 In his discussion
of the Aristotelian notion of place, Valla makes the same contrast between phi-
losophers and common people, including children: philosophers think that a bar-
rel or a storehouse cannot be empty because it still contains air even if everything
has been removed. The common people (populus, vulgus) have of course no prob-
lem in saying that the barrel is empty:
What form of speech shall I follow?What path shall I take, the well-worn and
ordinary [tritumne et vulgare], or the one taken by those who philosophize?
Not keeping to custom is proud; straying from the straight way is scandalous!
But let us see who speaks better, the ordinary person or the philosopher. The
ordinary person says that he calls the barrel “empty” when it lacks liquid. . . .
Let the ordinary person respond that his is “the right to decide standards in
language,” and that he does not call such things “full” when there is nothing
but air in them, except when the air itself is of some importance, as when the
sails of ships or a ball or balloon for playing games are full.7169 Ibid., 1:89 (DD 1.8.1).
70 Ibid., 1:33 (DD 1.2.26).
71 Ibid., 1:267 (DD 1.17.38), with reference to Horace’s Ars Poetica 70–72: Horace, 457.
Therefore, populus does not always connote users of Latin (pace Tavoni, 1986, 207). The example
derives from Cicero’s De fato, 11.24: Cicero, 1942b, 221.
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18 VOLUME LXXI , NO. 1RENAISSANCE QUARTERLYValla thus concludes that the “ordinary person [populus] speaks better than the
philosopher, then, and all the best writers agree, calling the air above us some-
times ‘empty,’ sometimes ‘void,’ ” and he gives quotations from Virgil, Quin-
tilian, and Cicero.72 And while this last addition shows that Valla, naturally,
has Latin in mind, his point about the use of the word empty, just as the word
one, seems to be language independent.
The way of the common people is also the perspective in Valla’s criticisms of
the Aristotelian distinction of act and potency. Things can be turned or made
into something else, as even a child knows, but what is the point of turning this
simple fact of life into a metaphysical doctrine expressed in technical terminol-
ogy?73
He [i.e., Aristotle] actually says that “this wood or this tree-trunk is a box not
in act but in potency.”Go ahead, Aristotle, make a box out of this wood. Will
we say that “this wood is a box in act?” Has anyone ever talked that way? . . .
What is the point of adding “in act”? Obviously, you reply, because for the
wood to be a box is something else. Has anyone ever talked this way either,
since reason does not even permit the locution? For it is one thing for wood to
be able [posse] to be made into a box, another for it to be a box in potency
[potentia]. In saying that it is “able to be made into a box,” we already declare
that it is not a box since, once it has been made that, it is not able to be made
again into what it already was. How much better it would have been to keep
the ordinary way of speaking [communem loquendi consuetudinem]: “this
wood can be made into a box”! In other words, “the form and shape of this
wood is changeable into the form and shape of a box.”74
Valla’s grammatical perspective leads him then to review words ending in –able,
like changeable, breakable, and drinkable; such words sometimes signify “a po-
tency” ( potentia), “possibility” ( possibilitas), or “aptitude” (aptitudo).75 This ap-
titude or nature of a thing, however, is a quality rather than an action: “What
Aristotle should have said, then, is ‘this tree-trunk is convertible into a box,’
not that it ‘is a box in potency.’” After a similar critique of entelecheia, another
term traditionally standing for action, act, or working, Valla says “good-bye to72 Valla, 2012, 1:269 (DD 1.17.42).
73 Ibid., 1:229–31 (DD 1.16.6–8).
74 Ibid., 1:231 (DD 1.16.7). “Reason” (ratio) here seems to refer to internal consistency.
Valla seems to suggest that “to be a box in potency” is internally inconsistent: it is either a box
or it is not.
75 Ibid. (DD 1.16.8), for this and the following quotation.
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Athese ﬁnicky and evasive terms of Aristotle’s,”76 admonishing us to turn to a de-
scription of things that is “simpler” and “better suited to natural meaning and
ordinary usage.”77 At other places Valla also appeals to ordinary usage where the
question does not seem to be a particular word of Latin—when, for instance, he
criticizes the dialecticians’ account of contraries: “in ordinary usage [communi
consuetudine], we call a statement ‘false’when it has something false in it.”78 Like-
wise, he appeals to “normal use of human language” (consuetudine sermonis humani)
to defend questions such as “what was before time?” and “what is beyond the
heavens?”79“THE STRICT STANDARD OF TRUTH” VERSUS
“OUR COMMON WAY OF SPEAKING”
Closely related to but not identical with the contrast between the people and the
philosophers is a distinction between speaking according to the lex veritatis (the
strict standard of truth) and vulgaris consuetudo (our common way of speaking),
a distinction that Valla borrows fromCicero, Seneca, and other classical sources.
Speaking according to the standard of truth is not wrong—indeed, as the phrase
suggests, it can be an adequate reﬂection of a state of affairs—but it is not com-
mon usage. Someone might say, for instance, that one thing is “more necessary”
than another but “strictly speaking [ad legem veritatis], one thing is not more or
less necessary than another, though perhaps it may be in ordinary usage [ad
vulgarem consuetudinem].”80 Likewise, in another chapter Valla comments on
the applicability of more or less, defending words such as rotundius (more round),
plenius (more full), and triplicius (more triple), as well as expressions such as
“nothing is more perfect than the perfect.” We are allowed to use these words,
“especially if we speak according to common linguistic usage [ad usum communem
loquimur]”; for “it is one thing to speak in accordance to the very standard of truth
[legem ipsam veritatis], it is another thing to speak in accordance to popular cus-
tom [ad consuetudinem popularem], common to virtually the whole human race.”81
In a later version of theDialectical Disputations, this passage becomes, “if we were
speaking like Stoics by the strictest standard of truth, we would not use” such
words.82 Valla alludes here to the reputation of the Stoics as being stern, even76 Ibid., 1:233 (DD 1.16.10).
77 Ibid. (DD 1.16.11): “ad naturalem sensum usumque communem accommodatius.”
78 Ibid., 2:101 (DD 2.14.3).
79 Ibid., 2:361 (DD 3.14.14).
80 Ibid., 2:137 (DD 2.19.15); cf. Valla, 1982, 2:495 (Repastinatio 2.15.15).
81 Valla, 1982, 2:386 (Repastinatio 1.7.10).
82 Valla, 2012, 1:287 (DD 1.18.9).
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20 VOLUME LXXI , NO. 1RENAISSANCE QUARTERLYrigid, philosophers,83 and he also again refers to Cicero’s opinion that the orator
must not weigh his words in the goldsmith’s balance but rather in common scales.84
Roughly the same contrast is found in a discussion on the notion of the “middle,”
provoked by the Aristotelian doctrine of virtue as the middle between two ex-
tremes: “Perhaps there will be no middle between these things [viz. between day-
time and nighttime, sleeping and waking, living and dead, healthy and ill,
uneducated and educated, sober and drunk], by the standard of truth [ad legem
veritatis], but in common understanding [communem intellectum] there is a mid-
dle between them.”85
The difference between this contrast of the strict standard versus the common
way of speaking and the contrast between the philosopher’s use of terms such as
one and empty versus the common way of the people is that in the ﬁrst case the
philosophical use is acceptable (though not in line with common practice) but
is rejected in the second case. But in both cases common understanding and com-
mon language go hand in hand, and are contrasted with philosophical analysis
and language.
All these examples show that Valla uses the same terms in different contexts for
different purposes. In some contexts, the distinction is between the Latin of the
best authors and the Latin as the sermo vulgaris (or sermo popularis); especially in
grammatical contexts the consuetudo to be followed is that of the best authors. In
other contexts, the contrast is between Latin and the vernacular (however called
by Valla). In still other contexts, good Latin is opposed to the so-called barbarous
Latin of the Scholastics, an opposition that often takes the form of a contrast be-
tween a natural way of using language (any language) versus the unnatural, un-
common, and contorted way of using language and analyzing arguments of which
the Scholastics are accused. These contrasts often overlap, so that when Valla
wants to criticize the language of the Scholastics as artiﬁcial, unnatural, uncom-
mon, and ungrammatical, he contrasts it with what is natural and common—83 In letter 59, Seneca contrasts the publica verba (everyday meaning) to the signiﬁcatio Stoi-
corum (meaning according to the Stoics): Seneca, 162. For Cicero’s negative judgment of Stoic
dialectics, see, e.g., Cicero, 1942a, 59, 313 (De oratore 1.83, 2.159). Without using “Stoicism”
in a historically and doctrinally accurate sense, Valla had identiﬁed it with an abstract, rationalist
position in moral philosophy in his De Vero Bono.
84 Cicero, 1942a, 313 (De oratore 2.38.159). Tavoni, 1984, 144n49, argues that Valla disap-
proves of the popularis trutina (common scales), but Valla clearly sides with it in the equivalent
passage in the earlier version (Valla, 1982, 2:386). In this speciﬁc example of the use of superla-
tive, Valla criticizes the application of the superlative to things not of the same gender or number,
an application he ﬁnds in many good authors. As can be seen from the ﬁrst version, Valla’s mean-
ing is that the common scales are better than a strict, Stoic usage.
85 Valla, 2012, 2:291 (DD 1.19.3).
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VALLA ’S HUMANIST PROGRAM 21
Asuitably ﬂexible terms that can refer, depending on the context, to the speech of
the orators and the best authors, to the speech of the common people, and even,
as just noted, to that of simple, uneducated folk. Hence, the following three cases
may be distinguished: ﬁrst, when Valla wants to show that certain Scholastic vo-
cabulary is ungrammatical, he appeals to the Latin of the best authors. Second,
when he wants to show that Scholastic Latin is abstract (and often, though not
necessarily, ungrammatical), he appeals to the common linguistic usage of the
people, often referred to as the sermo vulgaris or sermo communis, closely related
to but not identical with that of the authoritative authors. Third, when he wants
to argue that the way in which the Scholastics analyze and categorize forms of ar-
gumentation does not reﬂect the actual way in which people think, argue, and
speak, he appeals to the way in which “we normally speak” (solemus dicere), either
in more cultured and literary forms, such as orations, or in more mundane, daily
contexts, independent of the language at stake. So it depends on the context of the
discussion with what the so-called barbarous language of the Scholastics is com-
pared, but whatever it is that comes at the positive side of the comparison, this is
considered natural and common.NATURAL SPEECH
This ﬂexibility is reﬂected by Valla’s use of the term naturalis (natural), which he
applies to different categories. It is a recurrent word in Valla’s critique of Scholas-
tic logic in books 2 and 3 of the Dialectical Disputations. He thinks, for example,
that some syllogistic forms (or parts of them) can be detected in the talk of all
kinds of people: “But the form of the syllogism is not the clever thing cleverly dis-
puted by me to describe the nature of the syllogism—you may gather how easy it
is not only to understand but also to construct even when children talk among
themselves, though they generally leave out the conclusion. I am talking about
real syllogisms: for most of what is taught about syllogisms goes against nature
and everyone’s usage [omniumusum].”86 Some syllogistic patterns can therefore be
accepted since they can be observed in the speech of “even peasants, even women,
even children.”87 In an earlier version of this passage Valla had made the same
point, saying that he had noted the moods of which he approves, “not only in
books and in the talk of the learned people but also in that of the uneducated (that
is, those who speak in a natural way [imperitorum idest naturaliter loquentium]).”88
But to note and reconstruct syllogistic patterns in the speech of people is one
thing, to insert fully ﬂedged syllogisms in one’s speech is another; at least, this86 Ibid., 2:231 (DD 3.2.15).
87 Ibid., 2:269 (DD 3.9.4).
88 Valla, 1982, 2:548 (Repastinatio 3.12.8).
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22 VOLUME LXXI , NO. 1RENAISSANCE QUARTERLYis what Valla seems to mean when he explains in a different passage—and in ap-
parent contradiction to what he had said in the passages just quoted—that “those
who speak naturally [naturaliter], like orators, very rarely use the syllogism.”89 But
while people naturally speak and argue in ways that show at times patterns of syl-
logistic reasoning, the art of dialectic that has arisen, so to speak, out of this fact
is completely “against nature”: “most of what is taught about syllogisms goes
against nature and everyone’s usage.”90 Nobody would argue, for instance, in
accordance with the patterns as laid down in the third ﬁgure of the syllogism (ev-
ery man is a substance; every man is an animal; therefore, some animal is a sub-
stance). Likewise, in criticizing examples such as “Plato is every animal” (Plato est
omne animal ) and “Plato is no animal” (Plato est nullum animal ), Valla comments:
“Let us speak naturally and in the way people speak.”91 Introducing his critique
of the art of dialectic, however, Valla applies the word natural to the speech of
the educated people, admonishing modern philosophers “to turn back to speech
that is natural, speech commonly used by educated people.”92“STATUTES AND CUSTOMS OF LANGUAGE
AS A KIND OF CIVIL LAW”
This is therefore the reason for this ﬂexible use of the term natural. Because Valla
thinks the language of the Scholastics is often not only ungrammatical but also
unnatural and distorted, he sometimes presses the educated and the uneducated
into a coalition of people who, arguably, follow nature (natura) in their speech
and thinking. Unlike the Scholastics, the educated and the uneducated do not
twist and distort the established meanings of words or the usual patterns of hu-
man argumentation and thinking. These two levels—ﬁrst, linguistic usage in
Latin (in which, as observed above, Valla distinguishes between the sermo vulgaris
and the sermo litteratus) and, second, natural speaking and arguing more gener-
ally, regardless of the language being used (but always opposed to the so-called89 Valla, 2012, 2:228 (DD 3.2.12). In the same vein, he criticizes Boethius for giving an
example of an enthymeme “abhorrent to the orator’s practice, or rather to ordinary human
understanding [a communi hominum intellectu]”: ibid., 2:423 (DD 3.17.10).
90 Ibid., 2:231 (DD 3.2.16).
91 Valla, 1982, 2:485 (Repastinatio 2.12.15): “naturaliter atque hominum more.” Cf. Valla,
2012, 2:113 (DD 2.15.14).
92 Valla, 2012, 2:209 (DD 3.proem.3): “ad naturalem et a doctis tritum sermonem.” There is
one place where Valla applies the word natural to the vernacular, with a reference to Aulus Gellius
(Noctes Atticae 12.2.1); Valla, 1962, 1:437; and also in Valla, 2007, 395 (Raudensiane Notae); he
refers to his own Elegantiae: see Valla, 1962, 1:5 (Elegantiae 1.7).
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VALLA ’S HUMANIST PROGRAM 23
Aartiﬁcial, unnatural way of speaking and arguing in philosophy)—thus run easily
into one another or are combined somehow if it serves Valla’s polemical goals.
This blending of levels can also be seen in Valla’s claim that whatever language
people speak, they must always conform themselves to the usage, custom, and
conventions of our community: “Anyone who abandons it [i.e., usage] must
be hooted out of the company of educated people, no less than the scofﬂaw
and scorner of custommust be expelled from the community. And just as nations
and peoples have different customs and different laws, so do the natures of lan-
guages differ, each one sacred and unsullied among its own. Therefore we must
rely on usage, as if it were a kind of established practice in the community
[tanquam quodammore civili].”93 Here Valla is moving smoothly from the sphere
of Latin (“the educated people”) to languages in general. He feels that his point is
valid for any kind of language: it is usage that accounts for the structure of a lan-
guage, creating a community of language users. That is also the reason why a gen-
eral theory of grammar, here called byValla ratio, such as developed by speculative
grammarians, the so-called Modists, must fail: “In fact, Greek, Hebrew, Latin,
Punic, Dalmatian and other tongues differ not just in the words that are spoken,
but in how speech is constructed, and this happens because of practice [usu], not
theory [ratione], except in a few cases. We can no more give a theory for grammar
(as some of those idiots do, including those whowrite about ‘modes of signifying’)
than for the different words that different peoples use.”94 Not only must a gen-
eral theory of grammar valid for all the different languages fail, but also the impo-
sition of any type of language or terminology that does not reﬂect the established
practices of the community.
This is precisely Valla’s accusation: the so-called barbarous, distorted, and
technical language of the Scholastics does not reﬂect such amos civilis (established
practice in the community). By inventing their own language they have placed
themselves outside the community. Because their language does not reﬂect the
linguistic usage of the community, it has been able to engender the strange puz-
zles, sophistries, sophisms, forms of unnatural argumentation, and artiﬁcial prob-
lems that seem to form almost the raison d’être of the philosopher’s existence. In
criticizing their captiones (sophistries), Valla condemns their philosophical prac-
tice and language again in terms of fraud and transgression of the law: “As long
as I speak according to the usage of educated people, I cannot be rebuked, and
if you attack me with sophistries, I shall appeal to the statutes and customs of lan-93 Valla, 2012, 2:89 (DD 2.11.14).
94 Ibid., 2:85 (DD 2.11.7). See Law, 172–79, for a basic introduction on the Modists; and
Rosier for a full treatment. For a humanist attack on the Modists, see Alexander Hegius’s po-
lemic edited in IJsewijn. For Valla and medieval grammar, see Gavinelli; Codoñer Merino; Lo
Monaco.
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24 VOLUME LXXI , NO. 1RENAISSANCE QUARTERLYguage as a kind of civil law. In civil law there is no place for sophistry, in fact, and
if anything is done with intent to defraud, the ruling will be to rescind it and
make it null and void. But to oppose sophistries we should examine them in detail
and ponder the weight of their words.”95 Once again, Valla is defending here his
program of a reform of Latin and the study of Latin grammar by appealing to the
usage of the educated people. But as part of his defense he is also treating Latin—
next to elevating Latin to the status of an almost sacred language96—on a par with
other languages (“Greek, Hebrew, Latin, Punic, Dalmatian and other tongues”),
each with its own structure, usage, conventions, and community—a linguistic
mos civilis. Both strategies ensure that Scholastics are to be regarded as outsiders
and outlaws.
Valla’s remedy is captured by the title of the chapter from which this last
quotation is taken: “That special consideration is to be given to the weight of
words.”97 It is only through a careful study of language as it has been used and
ought to be used that the sophistries and the philosophical problems can be re-
solved, since these are the result only of a misunderstanding of language: these
philosophers are “incapable of grasping any doctrine clearly, since they have too
little skill in their own language—Latin, that is,” let alone any skill in Greek,
the language of their own master, Aristotle.98 It is Valla’s ambition, then, to show
the linguistic roots of the philosophers’ problems and their mistakes: “These di-
alecticians of yours, then, these philosophizers, should no longer wish to persevere
in the ignorance of certain terms that they use, and they should turn back to
speech that is natural, speech commonly used by educated people, especially since
they will make no progress if they do otherwise, now that I have uncovered the
truth about the many words that are the source of most mistakes.”99 Words
and arguments should not be taken out of context, since this will easily change95 Valla, 2012, 2:355–57 (DD 3.14.5–6).
96 Valla, 1962, 2:4 (Elegantiae 1.proem).
97 Valla, 2012, 2:353 (DD 3.14).
98 Ibid., 1:11 (DD 1.proem.17). Aristotle too is accused of having little skill in his own
language, taking Greek words and expressions sometimes in ways that do not reﬂect the lin-
guistic custom, though Valla does not say which custom he has in mind. He vaguely speaks of
“the Greeks,” using even Latin quotations to make his point: ibid., 1:171 (DD 1.10.69); cf.
ibid., 1:173 (DD 1.10.74–75). In ibid., 1:9 (DD 1.proem.12), the translation is incorrect: it
is Aristotle rather than “some Latins” who is criticized for having paid no attention to “learn-
ing foreign languages, not even his own so much.”
99 Ibid., 2:209–11 (DD 3.proem.3). Cf. ibid., 1:7 (DD 1.proem.9): “Even if they [Avicenna
and Averroes] were great men, how much authority should they have when the meaning of
words is in question, as in most problems in philosophy.”
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Atheir normal, commonmeaning and, consequently, will give rise to philosophical
problems where none existed.CONCLUSION
In the context of Valla’s critique of Aristotelian-Scholastic thought, expressions
such as common and natural language (and common linguistic usage) usually refer
to the language of the educated people, as testiﬁed by phrases such as “speech
that is common as well as learned [ popularis sermo atque eruditorum]” and “speech
that is natural, speech commonly used by educated people [ad naturalem et a
doctis tritum sermonem].”100 The category of educated people includes all writers
who have adopted the Latin of the great authors from antiquity. Yet in spite of his
vast learning and reading, many of his examples come from a rather limited range
of authors, among whom—in spite of his professed predilection for Quintilian—
Cicero takes pride of place in terms of sheer number of quotations, at least in the
Elegantiae. Archaic writers, poets, and late classical authors (including Christian
ones) are discarded, while Seneca, Tacitus, and the two Plinys are rarely cited (and
if so, often criticized).101 But while he often cites the great Latin writers, Valla also
at times clearly distinguishes between authority and linguistic usage, taking the
latter frequently in a broad sense of what we are used to saying (solemus dicere)
in Latin or—because Valla’s universe is a Latin one—simply what we are used
to saying. As has been shown, he often speaks about Latin as the sermo vulgaris,
without, however, having a particular variety or a particular historical period in
mind. If it suits his argument and polemical point, he may even take a broader
look, widening the scope of the natural and ordinary to include the speech and
linguistic habits of children, “mere women” (mulierculae), and uneducated peo-
ple, in order to contrast that with what he thinks is the outlandish, unnatural, and
esoteric attitude and language of the (Scholastic) philosophers. In drawing on the
old topos of the vanity and folly of the learned versus the real wisdom of the sim-
ple, common folk, Valla presents himself at times as the defender of the common
people because they use language in accordance with the customs of their society,
using words “for a purpose, not for a game.”102 But it would of course go com-
pletely against his Latin world view to defend their language over and above that
of the learned and educated people, for it is in the latter’s community that Valla
naturally situates himself.100 Ibid., 1:107 (DD 1.9.7), 2:209 (DD 3.proem.3).
101 Cesarini Martinelli, 66.
102 Valla, 2012, 1:33 (DD 1.2.26).
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26 VOLUME LXXI , NO. 1RENAISSANCE QUARTERLYTo stress the natural and common character of classical Latin (to be regained in
his own times)—as opposed to the allegedly unnatural character of the Latin of
his opponents—Valla appeals to terms and arguments (natural, common, the
people, community, rules and conventions, custom, law) that are arguably more
at home in the domain of naturally spoken languages of people who do not usu-
ally belong to the literate and educated (though in Quintilian’s time the situation
was different, of course). Valla’s ﬂexibility in using these terms thus creates at
times an uneasy coalition of learned authors and the uneducated people. This
ﬂexibility also suggests that the debate among modern scholars is not so easily re-
solved: as noted in the introduction, some scholars think that Valla’s use of the
term natural, for instance, refers to Latin, others to the vernacular, but as this ar-
ticle has shown Valla does not use these terms always with the same meaning.
These terms are used in different argumentative contexts, with different aims,
and sometimes with a different target in mind (fellow humanists, Scholastics,
grammarians, and so on).
As discussed in the introduction, scholars have also disagreed about the na-
ture of Valla’s program: is it a purely descriptive, empirical approach that focuses
entirely on the observation of the best practices of classical authors, or is it a
normative program that aims at a certain rationalization and idealization of lin-
guistic phenomena, based on—but not always necessarily supported by—obser-
vation of actual usage? From the argument developed here it turns out that
Valla’s program can be called both, depending on which aspect one stresses. It
is descriptive in that it describes, with a plethora of examples, linguistic usage
of classical authors, and it is normative in that it takes this kind of Latin as the
norm to be followed. It is also normative in the sense that it rationalizes or
emends this usage—even Ciceronian usage—if Valla thinks certain linguistic
constructions can reﬂect the state of affairs in a more transparent way. Analyzing
Valla’s discussion of, for example, the superlative and the comparative, the use
of possessive pronouns, the use of quam (how) and valde (very), and the use of
ecce (see!), Lucia Cesarini Martinelli has concluded that Valla frequently at-
tempted to “reconstruct the rational coherence of language,” showing at times
a certain creativity in formulating rules and even inventing examples to get rid of
ambiguities or contradictions in the Latin he was analyzing.103 Such examples,
however, should not lead to belittling the empirical character of Valla’s ap-
proach toward Latin, for he always based himself on authoritative writers; but103 Cesarini Martinelli, 58, 69, 71, 75, 77. In such instances, Valla is often found saying “I
would rather like to say” (malim dicere) or “such I would not have said” (non dicerem), which in-
dicates how he thinks his own rule or analysis reﬂects the facts in amore transparent way. See, e.g.,
Valla, 2012, 2:362 (DD 3.14.18)—one among many examples. See also Fubini, 1961, 544–45.
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Aagain, the descriptive and the normative are found to go together: the expression
that is found most in use among the authorities is the one to be preferred.104
This brings me to the last and perhaps most fundamental question in this
whole debate: is Valla’s program internally not inconsistent in its historicizing
tendencies, while presenting an almost frozen kind of Latin, only slightly up-
dated with some new words to describe postclassical things such as bombarda
(canon), as the yardstick for his own times?105 The notion of Latin as a universal
language that could apparently transcend time and place seems difﬁcult to square
with the notion of Latin as a historical phenomenon that developed in a particular
time. Likewise, in his more polemical moments Valla’s defense of the common
people (whatever language they use, “each one sacred and unsullied among its
own”106), who express the truth of the matter in a better way than the philoso-
phers do, seems difﬁcult to reconcile with the unique and privileged position of
Latin as the magnum sacramentum (great sacred teaching).
Whether one feels a strong tension here depends on how to interpret the in-
terdependence of the different contexts that, as observed above, sometimes become
conﬂated in Valla’s more polemical moments: the context of the restoration of
classical Latin and the context of thinking about language as a naturally evolving
social practice used by a living community of speakers that can be presented as the
common people (vulgus, populus). In the sphere of Latin, Valla studies ancient
writers not (or not primarily) for purely disinterested, historical, or scholarly rea-
sons but for reasons of imitation, replication, and restoration. The stress on lin-
guistic usage or what is found most often in use in the preferred classical authors
must not solely be taken as an indication of such a disinterested, empirical study
of a historical phenomenon. Rather, from the rich soil of classical usage Valla se-
lects—and emends—what he takes then as the norm (because it is represented
by the best authors in the most cases—clearly a circular argument here), and this
norm has to be somehow ﬁxed (and then learned and taught): a shifting norm
is not a good norm. Hence, later forms of Latin are not acceptable; the usus to
be imitated is limited to the classical period, and must be regularized by ratio.
As Valla argues, the existence of schools, teachers, and grammar books in antiq-
uity shows that a child was not able to learn good Latin solely from observation of104 Cesarini Martinelli, 75: “the usage of a linguistic form by the majority of the author-
itative writers seems to have its own theoretical legitimization. . . . The law of the majority
thus stabilizes not only what is the case for the majority but also what should be the case for
the majority [non solo ciò che, per lo più, è, ma anche ciò che per lo più deve essere].”
105 “New things demand new words”: Valla, 1981, 106; also in Valla, 1962, 1:504. See
Wesseling; Besomi; Gaeta, 79.
106 Valla, 2012, 2:89 (DD 2.11.14).
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28 VOLUME LXXI , NO. 1RENAISSANCE QUARTERLYusage (usus).107 For the same reason the vernacular is not a viable option either, as
it is subject to continuous, spontaneous change; usus in this sense of actual usage
without any kind of grammatical structure and order cannot stabilize and guar-
antee the correctness of speech; ratio in the sense of grammatical rules is required.
The vernacular is clearly not an ars.108 Valla’s descriptive and historicizing ap-
proach thus has its chronological limit, serving the higher goal of restoring Latin
to its most ideal form.109 Valla clearly believes in Latin as a universal language, an
ars, governed by rules that are based on usage. (And where these rules allow too
much exception they must be tidied up a little bit, as Valla seems to suggest.)
Hence, as seen, these two important sources—usus (based on authority) and ra-
tio—do not contradict but complement each other.110
In other contexts, as discussed above, Valla makes a different, almost sociolin-
guistic point, viz. that language cannot be invented or prescribed at will by a small
group of people on the fringe of society. Language is a social practice, and should
be treated as such, for “to the ordinary person [populus] belongs the mastery of
language and a rule [arbitrium et normam loquendi].”111 This is true for any lan-
guage and linguistic community. For Valla this means hooting the Scholastics out
of the company of the educated people. While this suggests a conﬁrmation of
Latin as an ars, his picture of Latin as a common, natural language—a social prac-
tice, ruled by conventions and customs—can be seen as an example or illustra-
tion of this broader, sociolinguistic insight. Latin can then be treated on a par with
other languages—“Greek, Hebrew, Latin, Punic, Dalmatian and other tongues,”107 Valla in Camporeale, 527 (Apologus 2); Cesarini Martinelli, 60.
108 In the absence of grammatical rules or rules of correctness, one cannot say that one
speaks Venetian better (emendatius) than another, or that one speaks Florentine better than
another. See Valla in Camporeale, 525 (Apologus 2); see Cesarini Martinelli, 61–62.
109 Defending his translation of a passage from theNewTestament, Valla claims that his trans-
lation is “more Latin, hence clearer and no less true [Latinius et perinde apertius nec minus verum]”:
Valla, 1978, 112 (Antidotum 1), quoted by Cesarini Martinelli; for other examples, see Cesarini
Martinelli, 71. The background is of course the classical discussion of the qualities of good Latin
style. From Pseudo-Cicero’s Ad Herennium, Valla takes over the notion of elegantia, which com-
prises Latinity (Latinitas) and clarity (explanatio). As is well known, this is a notion of semantic
correctness and reﬁnement. See Marsh, 100.
110 But there are some cases where usage is not supported by reason. For one example, see
Valla, 2012, 1:41 (DD 1.3.8): “This I would call amazing, scarcely supported by reason [ratione]
but completely borne out by usage [usu]: that these very words [such as ‘the white,’ album], whose
concrete signiﬁcation I deny, I admit to have concrete signiﬁcation in the plural.” For a discussion
of Valla’s chapter on abstract and concrete terms, see Nauta, 2009, 74–77.
111 Valla, 2012, 1:266 (DD 1.17.40): “Respondeat populus penes se esse arbitrium . . . et
normam loquendi.” The phrase goes back to Horace’s Ars Poetica 70–72: Horace, 457.
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A“each one sacred and unsullied among its own.”112 Whatever language we speak,
we must conform ourselves to the usage and conventions of our community.
The tension that can be detected between Latin as one of the natural languages,
ruled by conventions shaped and developed by their communities, and Latin as
an ars, based on usus but also governed by ratio, reveals the two basic options that
developed only after Valla’s death: the use of the vernaculars also as languages of
arts and science, and Latin as a “dead,” artiﬁcial language, useful or even vital for
the growth of the republic of letters, but no longer presented as a common, nat-
ural language.112 Valla, 2012, 2:85 (DD 2.11.7), 2:89 (DD 2.11.14).
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